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To shed light on the limited success of competition enhancing policies in mobile telecom-
munications, I estimate a game of transceivers’ locations between national incumbents and
a new entrant in Canada. I recover player-specific unobserved heterogeneity from bids for
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bents’ responses to the new entrant’s decisions. I find that incumbents benefitting from
important economies of density is a plausible explanation for policies’ drawbacks. I then
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1 Introduction
The state of competition in mobile telecommunications has been open to debate in many devel-
oped countries. On the one hand, as one would expect from a natural oligopoly, considerable
investments required to operate a mobile network may discourage new firms to compete against
incumbents. On the other hand, industry regulators often advocate intensified competition to
avoid having to intervene and prevent incumbents from exercising market power. Unfortunately,
competition enhancing policies often fail to sustainably increase the number of providers oper-
ating in the industry. In the past, several smaller players have merged together or were bought
by larger providers.1 In the United States, recent high profile examples of potential reduc-
tions in the number of players are the repeated merger attempts between T-Mobile and Sprint,
respectively the third and fourth largest mobile providers in the country.
In this article, I shed light on important drawbacks in the Canadian government’s at-
tempts to increase competition in an industry long dominated by three national incumbents.
In Canada, as in many other countries, spectrum licenses required to develop a mobile network
are allocated through auctions. In hopes to encourage new firms entering the industry, the gov-
ernment prevents national incumbents from bidding on a fraction of licenses set aside for small
and regional players. During the 2008 Advanced Wireless Services 1 (AWS1-2008) auction, a
handful of new providers took advantage of this set-aside policy and built a mobile network.
However, some of these firms failed to use the spectrum they were allocated and eventually
resold it to other providers, including incumbents. Furthermore, some of these providers went
out of business and were bought by incumbents.
In order to understand these drawbacks and to evaluate the potential of alternative policies,
I estimate an empirical game in which providers, more precisely three incumbents and a new
entrant, decide where and how many transceivers (i.e., cell antennae) to install. I find that there
are important economies of density in transceivers’ locations. Because it is building a brand new
network, the new entrant cannot benefit from such economies of density to the same extent as
incumbents. This asymmetry may explain the drawbacks mentioned above and motivates the
study of a counterfactual policy. I evaluate the equilibrium effects of subsidizing the first few
transceivers installed by the new entrant, in order to compensate its lack of economies of density.
1For a description of the evolution of market structure in many countries’ mobile telecommunications indus-
try, see Gruber (2005, chapters 3 and 7).
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My results suggest that this policy encourages the new provider to install more transceivers,
while generating only minor distortions in incumbents’ decisions. In some cases, I even find
incumbents to be slightly more likely to install transceivers in response to the increase in the
new entrant’s probabilities of entering the market. This insight is especially relevant because, in
this industry, policy makers have been worried that encouraging investments from new entrants
may discourage investments made by incumbents.
Part of the current article’s contribution is to illustrate how recovering player-specific unob-
served heterogeneity from predetermined outcomes may help in identifying strategic interactions
between competitors. Being able to convincingly quantify strategic interactions in transceivers’
locations is key to properly assess the equilibrium effects of any counterfactual policies. Intu-
itively, one may hope to recover the effect of strategic interactions on players’ payoffs if there
exists an exogenous source of variation that does not affect their own payoffs, but shifts their
competitors’ decisions. In the same spirit as in other econometric models of simultaneous equa-
tions, many identification arguments available in the literature exploit exogenous variation in
some player-specific observable regressors that are excluded from competitors’ payoffs (e.g.,
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2003; Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov, 2010). In the
current setting, variation in stocks of transceivers previously accumulated would be a suitable
candidate. Unfortunately, such variation does not apply to the new entrant because, by defi-
nition, its stocks of transceivers are exactly zero across the country, therefore jeopardizing the
identification of incumbents’ responses to the new entrant’s decisions.
I argue that providers’ bids for spectrum licenses can be used to recover player-specific
unobservables which provide variation required for identification. I also discuss conditions
under which unobserved heterogeneity can be combined with equilibria multiplicity, i.e. another
source of variation that has been leveraged when player-specific regressors are not available
(Sweeting, 2009; De Paula and Tang, 2012; Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi, 2016). I compare
the identifying power of both approaches in the current context. I find that player-specific
unobserved heterogeneity is a more convincing source of variation then multiple equilibria, as
one may expect from an industry in which agreements between providers (e.g., network sharing,
tower sharing, domestic roaming, etc.), transceivers’ technology and spectrum compatibility
may affect transceivers’ locations, but are not observed by the econometrician.
2
It is worth mentioning that competition in mobile telecommunications is a topic that has
drawn considerable attention in economics.2 Several articles have studied Federal Communi-
cations Commission auctions in the United States focusing, among other topics, on collusion
(e.g., Cramton and Schwartz, 2000, 2002) and the efficiency of the system in place (e.g., Fox
and Bajari, 2013; Xiao and Yuan, 2018). Effects of changes in market structure on industry
outcomes have also been investigated. For instance, Bajari, Fox, and Ryan (2008) estimate
consumers’ valuation of larger coverage areas resulting from firms consolidation. Seim and
Viard (2011) examine how new entries affect retail pricing and product availability.
Data on transceivers’ locations have been used in other empirical studies. In particular, Sun
(2016) uses information on transceivers’ locations in Connecticut to assess the effect of signal
quality on providers’ market shares. Transceivers’ data are also used to control for product
quality in Bourreau, Sun, and Verboven (2018)’s study of tacit collusion in France. Also of
note is the article by Björkegren (2017) who uses data on towers’ locations in Rwanda to
measure network coverage and its effect on the adoption of mobile telephones.
These articles are far from being an exhaustive list of all empirical work done on competition
in mobile telecommunications. However, to the best of my knowledge, despite the fact that
transceivers’ locations are important determinants of competition in this industry, the current
effort is the first attempt at explicitly modelling strategic behaviour in such decisions through
a game of market entry.
Finally, the current article contributes to a recent and growing literature which advocates
allowing for a flexible information structure when estimating empirical games. While many
models can be classified as games of either complete or incomplete information,3 recent em-
pirical applications have shown that rigid assumptions on players’ information could lead to
significantly different results (see applications in Grieco, 2014; Magnolfi and Roncoroni, 2017;
Luo, Xiao, and Xiao, 2018). Grieco (2014) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019) consider a
framework that is closely related to the current article. It allows for both private and common-
knowledge unobservable information as well as multiple equilibria being realized in the data.
2For a general treatment of the topic at the early stage of the industry, see Armstrong (1997), Gruber (2005)
and references therein.
3For recent surveys, see Bajari, Hong, and Nekipelov (2013) and De Paula (2013). Commonly cited examples
of theoretical and empirical contributions include Bjorn and Vuong (1984), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a, 1991b),
Berry (1992), Tamer (2003), Seim (2006), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov
(2010), Galichon and Henry (2011), Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011), Aradillas-Lopez (2012) and
Lewbel and Tang (2015).
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Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017) consider an alternative equilibrium concept which also allows
for a flexible information structure and multiple equilibria. However, in all these articles, point
identification requires observable player-specific regressors and, therefore, the identification re-
sults therein do not directly apply here. To the best of my knowledge, the current article is
the first to propose exploiting the identifying power associated with variation in player-specific
unobservable heterogeneity in the estimation of an empirical game.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the industry
background and the role of transceivers in mobile telecommunications. The econometric model
to be estimated is introduced in Section 3. The data is described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
an important identification issue and the proposed solution. Sections 6 and 7 respectively report
estimation results and the counterfactual analysis. Section 8 concludes.
2 Industry background
Before laying out the empirical analysis, it is worth discussing some background informa-
tion. This section does not pretend to be a comprehensive description of the Canadian mobile
telecommunications industry. Instead, I report relevant facts to justify the model that I use.
Simply put, transceivers are antennae which are installed by network operators to provide
coverage in a given geographic area. Prior to installing transceivers, network operators must
obtain a spectrum license, which grants the right to exploit frequencies in the corresponding
geographic area. In Canada, since the early 2000’s, these licenses have been allocated through
auctions (see Industry Canada, 2004, 2011).
There are at least two reasons for installing a larger number of transceivers in a given
region.4 First, each transceiver can only provide coverage in a limited surrounding area. More
transceivers are therefore needed to cover larger regions. Second, there is a limit to the amount
of information that can be carried simultaneously through a given frequency. As a result, more
transceivers are needed in more densely populated areas.
The main reason for focusing on transceivers’ location decisions is to assess the properties
of the Canadian mobile telecommunications industry at the wholesale level. The wholesale
4For more detailed economic descriptions of the technology related to the mobile telecommunications indus-
try, see Hausman (2002) and Gruber (2005, chapter 2).
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market in mobile telecommunications relates to transactions through which a mobile service
provider allows another firm to use parts of its network and/or its installations to provide
network services. In fact, to provide coverage in a given area, operators may either install their
own transceivers or use other firms’. For instance, subscribers may use their mobile device
outside of their provider’s service area insofar as their provider has agreed to use another
operator’s network. Such agreements are referred to as domestic roaming. In some cases,
network operators may even agree to explicitly share parts of their networks with each other.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
Figure 1 shows transceivers’ locations5 for three incumbents (Rogers, Bell and Telus) and a
new entrant (Vidéotron). Some regional patterns are noticeable. In particular, while Rogers’
transceivers are spread out across the country, Bell and Telus tend to cover different areas.
Further, Vidéotron covers most of Quebec’s inhabited regions, but is roughly limited to that
province. These patterns are, at least in part, due to different agreements between network
operators. The terms of these agreements are, however, unobservable to the researcher. Fur-
thermore, technological constraints and potential limitations in spectrum compatibility may
also affect transceivers’ locations without being explicitly observed by the researcher. One can-
not simply omit the existence of such unobservables when studying strategic interactions in
transceivers’ locations: ideally, one should find a way of taking the effect of these unobservables
into account.
Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 1, there are some parts of Canada where only a
small number of providers have actually installed transceivers. Even if there exists regulatory
conditions regarding domestic roaming and site sharing (Industry Canada, 2013a), both the
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (the telecommunications reg-
ulating body in Canada) and the Competition Bureau have expressed concerns about the effect
of potential market power on negotiated agreements between incumbents and new entrants (see
Industry Canada, 2013b; Commissioner of Competition, 2014).6 Such concerns have justified
the federal government’s intention to increase the number of competitors in this industry.
5As will be clearly explained in Section 4, these are transceivers operating on frequencies allocated up to the
AWS1-2008 spectrum auction.
6See Church and Wilkins (2013) for an alternative view of the state of competition in the Canadian mobile
telecommunications industry.
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One of the main policies used by the government to encourage entry has been setting aside
some blocks of frequencies for new and regional players during spectrum auctions. On one
hand, spectrum set-asides have allowed new and regional service providers to acquire parts of
the spectrum and to operate a network. For instance, among new entrants associated with the
AWS1-2008 auction set-asides are Vidéotron, Wind, Eastlink, Mobilicity and Public Mobile.
On the other hand, two drawbacks of spectrum set-asides are worth mentioning. First, some
of the new entrants do not use all the spectrum they are assigned and eventually sell unused
frequencies to other firms, including incumbents. For instance, in 2017, Vidéotron sold some
of its licenses acquired in 2008 to Rogers for about twice the price it paid for.7 Second, some
of these firms go out of business and are acquired by incumbents. In fact, upon Industry
Canada’s and the Competition Bureau’s approvals, Telus bought Public Mobile and Rogers
acquired Mobilicity.8 The main objective of the current empirical application is to provide an
explanation for these drawbacks and to explore an alternative policy to palliate them.
3 Model of transceivers’ locations
Modelling current stocks of transceivers owned by each provider as a one-shot game of simulta-
neous decisions would be unrealistic. In Canada, the first cellular network came into service in
the mid-1980’s. Since then, there have been many important changes in terms of technology,
regulation and market structure. It would be simplistic to assume that any firm would commit
to their decisions over such a long period of time despite all these changes.
A more realistic view is to consider transceivers’ locations as resulting from a sequence of
games of simultaneous decisions. Different spectrum auctions define the timing of each game.
More precisely, I model providers’ decisions as an investment problem. After an auction is
completed, firms that have been granted licenses simultaneously choose how many transceivers
to add to their accumulated stocks. Each player’s payoff is affected by its current stocks of
transceivers, as well as its own and its competitors’ simultaneously chosen additions. Dynamics
are therefore included in the model by allowing current payoffs to depend on previous decisions
through stocks accumulation. In other words, existing stocks of transceivers are part of the state
7See Wire Report (2017).
8See the statements of approval given in Industry Canada (2013b, 2015) and Competition Bureau (2014).
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variables, such that past investments affect current decisions even if transceivers’ installation is
not explicitly modelled as a dynamic game. The resulting payoff functions should be interpreted
as a semi-reduced-form of the sum of the current and discounted expected future valuations.
There are two important reasons for not explicitly modelling forward-looking behaviour
through a dynamic game. First, I only observe a single auction with relevant strategic interac-
tions between incumbents and the new entrant.9 Second, it is not clear to what extent firms
are able to anticipate future regulatory and technological changes. In some sense, interpreting
payoff functions as semi-reduced-form value functions amounts to being fairly agnostic about
firms’ anticipation of the future.
I now introduce the game of interest in which all providers which have been granted a
spectrum license simultaneously choose the number of transceivers they want to install, i.e. an
element from a finite and discrete choice set of ordered actions. I first present the game as it
is played by the providers before turning to the game observed by the econometrician. Then,
I provide a reduced-form model for providers’ bids for spectrum licenses which will be used as
predetermined outcomes informative about player-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
3.1 A game of location decisions
Henceforth, random variables will be denoted by capital calligraphic letters and their realiza-
tions will be written in lower case letters. Boldface letters refer to vectors and matrices. Finally,
sets will be denoted with capital script letters.
Consider N network operators indexed by i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , N} simultaneously deciding
how many transceivers to install in a given market. Each provider can install at most J
transceivers in that market, i.e. they choose a single ordered action from a finite and discrete
set Y = {0, 1, . . . , J} called the choice set. Let Yi be the random variable with realization
yi ∈ Y corresponding to player i’s decision. Let Y be the vector of all players’ decisions with
9Between the AWS1-2008 auction and the construction of the dataset used for estimation, there have been
three other spectrum auctions relevant for mobile services: the 2014 Mobile Broadband Services (MBS-2014),
the 2015 Advanced Wireless Services 3 (AWS3-2015) and the 2015 Broadband Radio Services (BRS-2015)
auctions. However, these auctions are excluded from the analysis as they may be too recent for network service
providers to have had sufficient time to install new transceivers. In fact, for each of these auctions, there is
at least one player (incumbent and/or new entrant) that has not installed a single transceiver operating on its
allocated frequencies. In particular, none of the mobile service providers has installed transceivers operating on
AWS3-2015 frequencies according to the 2016 dataset I use. Notice that the AWS3-2015 frequencies were sold
in 2015 even if no mobile device available in Canada was operating on these frequencies at that time.
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realizations y ∈ YN . Throughout the article, the index −i will be used to refer to all players
except player i. For instance, Y−i with realizations y−i ∈ YN−1 are the decisions of player i’s
competitors.
Decisions are contingent on two types of state variables. First, all firms observe a vector of
state variables S = [S ′1, . . . ,S ′N ]
′ with realizations s = [s′1, . . . , s′N ]
′ ∈ ×i∈NSi that are common-
knowledge, with some elements of Si potentially common across i’s. Such state variables include
population density, distance to closest large population centre, existing stocks of transceivers,
spectrum licenses ownership and other common-knowledge variables that may affect providers’
payoffs. For instance, it would also include information about transceivers’ technology, which
varies across providers, and some possible restrictions related to spectrum compatibility. The
effect of different agreements (e.g., network sharing, tower sharing and domestic roaming) could
also be included in S. In fact, there is evidence that providers know at least some information
about agreements between their competitors. For example, Wind, another of the new entrants
in the industry, complained to the regulator that it was paying unfair domestic roaming rates
compared to rates that incumbents charged among themselves (Wire Report, 2014).
Second, for each player, there is a scalar state variable Ei with realization εi ∈ R that is
player i’s private information about its payoffs. For instance, a firm may have an agreement
with the property management of a high-rise building that makes it relatively more profitable
to install a transceiver at this location. The introduction of such private information in the
model makes this game of simultaneous decisions a game of incomplete information. Let GEi (·)
be the cumulative distribution function of Ei.
Let the function πi (·) : YN × Si ×R 7→ R be referred to as player i’s payoff function. More
precisely, πi (yi,y−i, si, εi) is player i’s payoff for choosing yi, when the other players choose y−i
and the realized state corresponds to (si, εi). The following assumptions, which are commonly
used in the literature, are maintained on state variables and payoff functions.
Assumption 1 (State variables and payoffs). (i) S, E1, . . . , EN are mutually independent.
(ii) GE1 (·), . . . , GEN (·) are common-knowledge to all players and they are absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure on R. (iii) π1 (·), . . . , πN (·) are common-knowledge to
all players.
Some restrictions are imposed on player i’s payoff function to ensure that its expected
8
payoffs are globally concave in yi for any si and εi. Let firm i’s payoff function be given by:
πi (yi,y−i, si, εi) = yi [ζi (y−i, si) + εi]− κ̄i (yi) (1)
where strategic interactions are captured by the index function ζi (·).
One should interpret yi [ζi (y−i, si) + εi] as the total revenue and κ̄i (yi) as the total cost
associated with installing yi transceivers for player i. Importantly, this specification is such
that the cost of installing transceivers is allowed to vary with the number of transceivers.
However, this cost does not depend on other players’ decisions nor the state variables, which
only affect revenues.
The timing of the game should be understood as follows. First, state variables are realized.
Then, players simultaneously choose an action from their choice set. By Assumption 1, player
i’s information set at the time of simultaneous decisions is given by:
Ii =
{
s, εi, {πn (·)}n∈N , {GEn (·)}n∈N
}
. (2)
In particular, players use their knowledge of the payoff functions and the distributions of the
private information state variables to form beliefs about their opponents’ decisions.
Player i’s strategy is a function, denoted ρi (·), that maps the information set to the choice
set, i.e. ρi (·) : Ii 7→ Y. The conditional choice probability (CCP) of player i choosing yi ∈ Y at
a given realization of the common-knowledge state variables s is therefore equal to:
Pi (yi| s) =
∫
1 {ρi (Ii) = yi} dGEi (εi) (3)
which can be interpreted as the beliefs formed by player i’s opponents regarding player i’s deci-
sion given strategy ρi (·). Let Pi (s) be a (J + 1)-dimensional vector collecting player i’s CCPs
with each element corresponding to a different action, i.e. Pi (s) ≡ [Pi (0| s) , . . . , Pi (J | s)]′, and
collect these vectors of CCPs in a N (J + 1)-dimensional vector P (s) ≡
[
P1 (s)
′ , . . . ,PN (s)
′]′.
Similarly as before, P−i (s) would be the (N − 1) (J + 1)-dimensional vector collecting the vec-
tors of CCPs for all players except player i.
Because player i does not know y−i at the time of decision, its strategy is based on its
expected payoffs. P−i (s) is used to define the expected payoff of player i choosing yi given s and
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εi. Defining the expected index as ζPi (s) ≡
∑
y−i∈YN−1 P (y−i| s) ζi (y−i, si), the corresponding
expected payoff is:
πPi (yi, s, εi) = yi
[
ζPi (s) + εi
]
− κ̄i (yi) . (4)
Let κi (j) ≡ κ̄i (j)− κ̄i (j − 1). In this case, player i maximizing its expected payoffs chooses:
yi =

0 ⇔ ζPi (s) + εi ≤ κi (1)
0 < j < J ⇔ κi (j) < ζPi (s) + εi ≤ κi (j + 1)
J ⇔ ζPi (s) + εi > κi (J) .
(5)
This choice rule has a natural economic interpretation. While ζPi (s) + εi can be interpreted
as the expected marginal revenue (constant across transceivers), κi (yi) is the marginal cost
of installing yi transceivers. The optimal number of transceivers is such that the expected
marginal revenue is greater than the marginal cost of the last transceiver installed and smaller
than the marginal cost of installing more transceivers.
For εi following the logistic distribution, the CCPs have the familiar ordered logit expression:




κi (1)− ζPi (s)
)
, for j = 0
Λ
(




κi (j)− ζPi (s)
)
, for 0 < j < J
1− Λ
(
κi (J)− ζPi (s)
)
, for j = J
(6)
where Λ (c) = exp {c} / [1 + exp {c}]. The right-hand side of (6) is a function of P−i (s) which
will be denoted ϕi (j, s,P−i (s)) and is interpreted as player i’s best response to its beliefs
regarding its opponents’ actions, i.e. P−i (s). Let Ψ (s,P (s)) be the N (J + 1)-dimensional
vector collecting these best-response functions for all actions and all players organized in the
same order as in P (s), i.e.:
Ψ (s,P (s)) = [ϕ1 (0, s,P−1 (s)) , . . . , ϕN (J, s,P−N (s))]
′ . (7)
It follows that:
P (s) = Ψ (s,P (s)) (8)
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and Ψ (s, ·) : [0, 1]N(J+1) 7→ [0, 1]N(J+1) is henceforth referred to as the best-response mapping.
Defining a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in the probability space is convenient to
analyze equilibrium existence and potential multiplicity (Milgrom and Weber, 1985). Definition
1 is the definition of equilibrium that is used throughout the article.
Definition 1 (Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies). For a given realization of common-
knowledge state variables s, a pure strategy BNE in the probability space is a vector of CCPs,






for any yi ∈ Y and any i ∈ N.
In other words, a BNE in pure strategies is a fixed point of the best-response mapping, i.e.
P∗ (s) = Ψ (s,P∗ (s)), such that each player’s beliefs are consistent with their opponents’. As
Ψ (s, ·) maps a compact set to itself and it is continuous in P (s), equilibrium existence follows
from Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. However, equilibrium uniqueness is not guaranteed.
Let T be a random variable with realization τ ∈ T (s) indicating which equilibrium is
played at a specific realization s.10 The distribution of T conditional on s, which will be
denoted λ (τ | s), should be interpreted as an equilibrium selection mechanism. The following
assumption is maintained for the rest of the article.
Assumption 2 (Equilibrium selection mechanism). T , E1, . . . , EN are mutually independent.
Moreover, T (s) is finite and discrete, such that λ (τ | s) is a probability mass function.
Assumption 2 is also maintained by Grieco (2014) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019),
among others. It has two important consequences. First, it ensures that players do not learn
about their opponents’ private information through equilibrium selection. Second, it rules out
continua of equilibria.
3.2 The econometric model
The main difference between the economic model presented above and the one that I will
estimate is that I only observe some of the state variables that are known to all players.
More formally, ∀i ∈ N, let Si = [X ′i,Vi]
′. Let X = [X ′1, . . . ,X ′N ]
′ with realizations x =
[x′1, . . . ,x
′
N ]
′ ∈ ×i∈NXi be the common-knowledge state variables observable to the econome-
trician. V = [V1, . . . ,VN ]′ with realizations ν = [ν1, . . . , νN ]′ ∈ RN is left as part of the
10Rigorous notation would use T (s) and τ (s), but the argument s is dropped when referring to the random
variable and its realization for simplicity.
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unobservables. By including this vector of unobservables, one introduces some asymmetry
between the researcher’s and the players’ information regarding common-knowledge payoff-
relevant state variables: V therefore has the same interpretation as unobservables in games of
complete information.
In fact, assuming that I know as much about a given mobile service provider’s relevant state
variables as its competitors do would be a strong assumption in this setting. I observe popula-
tion density, distance to closest large population centre, firms’ initial stocks of transceivers and
spectrum licenses ownership, which are variables that are included in X . These variables are
only a subset of common-knowledge state variables that affect providers’ payoffs. The variables
V = [V1, . . . ,VN ]′ would capture the effect of the remaining common-knowledge information
on each player’s payoffs. For instance, providers know more about how the technology used
and issues related to spectrum compatibility may affect their competitors’ payoffs than what is
observed in the data. As already mentioned above, some providers having complained to the
regulator about agreements between competitors being unfair also suggests that at least parts
of these agreements should be treated as common-knowledge information. These are just a few
examples of reasons to believe that mobile service providers know more about their competitors’
payoff-relevant state variables than what can be teased out of observable data.
Player i’s payoff can therefore be written as:
πi (yi,y−i,xi, νi, εi) = yi [ζi (y−i,xi, νi) + εi]− κ̄i (yi) . (9)
The corresponding expected payoff is:
πPi (yi,x,ν, εi) = yi
[
ζPi (x,ν) + εi
]
− κ̄i (yi) (10)
where ζPi (x,ν) ≡
∑
y−i∈YN−1 P (y−i|x,ν) ζi (y−i,xi, νi). The resulting CCPs are as in (6),
except that ζPi (x,ν) replaces ζPi (s). When estimating the model, I consider the following
parametric specification for ζi (·):












Once again, a BNE is defined by using CCPs given x and ν. The current econometric model
therefore allows for three types of unobservables from the econometrician’s point of view: (i)
private information (ε); (ii) common-knowledge payoff-relevant heterogeneity (ν); and (iii) the
variable indexing which equilibrium is realized (τ). In other words, this model allows for a
flexible information structure and multiple equilibria being realized in the data, along the lines
of Grieco (2014) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019).
It is worth mentionning that there exists other modelling approaches that would have de-
livered a flexible information structure and, in some cases, also allowed for multiple equilibria.
Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017)’s model based on Bayes Correlated Equilibria is a very appeal-
ing approach as it allows information sets to vary across realizations of the game and to be
asymmetric among players. While the partial identification results that the authors derive are
valuable and applicable in other settings, the large dimensionality of the parameter space in
the current application, where player-specific parameters are used to capture important asym-
metries in providers’ payoff functions, would make it computationnally burdensome. In their
setting, as in Tamer (2003) and in Grieco (2014), point identification can be achieved when
player-specific regressors are available. Unfortunately, as it will be emphasized in Section 5,
such regressors are not available for the new entrant in the current application.
Alternatively, correlation in unobserved state variables could have been modelled via Wan
and Xu (2014)’s approach. However, their identification result also requires player-specific
regressors and it implicitly assumes that there is a single equilibrium that is realized in the
data.
The main reason why I opted for the current approach as opposed to Magnolfi and Ron-
coroni (2017)’s or Wan and Xu (2014)’s is that I could relatively easily extend the identification
results available in the BNE literature to address the lack of player-specific observable regres-
sors satisfying the exclusion restriction required to identify strategic interactions. A detailed
discussion of this extension is presented in Section 5.
3.3 Bids as predetermined outcomes
An important component of the econometric model that I propose is the introduction of player-
specific predetermined outcomes, denoted Z = [Z ′1, . . . ,Z ′N ]
′, which will be used to recover
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common-knowledge payoff-relevant unobserved heterogeneity. In the current empirical applica-
tion, I use providers’ bids for spectrum licenses as such predetermined outcomes. In Assumption
3, I state conditions that must be satisfied by Z to be able to recover unobservable heterogene-
ity separately from the variable indexing which equilibria are realized in the data. I then argue
that these conditions are satisfied by bids for spectrum licenses.
Assumption 3 (Predetermined outcomes). (i) Z still depends on V after conditionning on
x, i.e. Z 6⊥ V |x. (ii) Z is conditionally independent of T given x and ν, i.e. Z ⊥ T |x,ν.
Assumption 3(i) simply states that predetermined outcomes must be informative about
common-knowledge payoff-relevant unobserved heterogeneity. Assumption 3(ii) is the condition
that must be satisfied by predetermined ouctomes if one hopes to recover these unobservables
separately from the variable indexing which equilibria are realized in the data. This condition
must therefore be satisfied if one wants to leverage both variation in V−i and T to identify
strategic interactions.
Using spectrum auctions when defining the timing of the game has three advantages. First,
because providers must bid for licenses prior to setting up a network, they must plan their
transceivers’ locations, at least to some extent, before knowing their competitors’ decisions.
In other words, the need to simultaneously plan transceivers’ locations before the spectrum is
auctioned argues in favour of modelling the investment problem as one involving simultaneous
decisions. Second, the requirement of spectrum licenses also directly addresses an important
challenge associated with the estimation of empirical games of market entry, i.e. the need to
determine the pool of potential entrants.
The third and most important advantage of focusing on an auction-specific game of simul-
taneous decisions is that providers’ bids can be used as predetermined outcome variables to
control for player-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Even if firms’ bidding behaviour is not
interpreted through a structural model, bids should reflect players’ valuations of operating a
network including common-knowledge payoff-relevant unobservable information. As a result,
players’ bids depend on V conditional on realizations of X , therefore satisfying Assumption
3(i). Moreover, these outcome variables are determined before transceivers’ location decisions.
In particular, at the bidding stage, firms do not know who will successfully acquire which fre-
quency blocks and, therefore, do not know which equilibrium will be played. A nice feature of
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the AWS1-2008 auction that is used in the current empirical application is that new players en-
tered the industry as a result of spectrum set-aside. Incumbents were then playing the game of
transceivers’ locations against new competitors, which arguably further weakened their ability
to predict the equilibrium to be played. For this reason, bids are considered to be conditionally
independent of the equilibrium selection variable, as required by Assumption 3(ii).
Notice that Assumption 3(ii) does not preclude the equilibrium of the game to be ex post
related with predetermined outcomes. In fact, one would expect it to be: both Z and T are
allowed to depend on X and V . Here, timing is key. Because providers do not know the
equilibrium that will be played at the transceivers’ location game, their bids do not depend on
this equilibrium. Of course, the equilibrium will depend on providers’ bidding behaviour as the
auction determines the potential entrants of the game.
Auctioned licenses allow service providers to use a block of frequencies for a given geographic
area called a tier region, which is defined by the federal government. The size of the geographic
area covered by a license is determined by which tier the license belongs to. Industry Canada
uses three different types of tiers when auctioning mobile spectrum licenses. Each type of tiers
partitions the whole country in regions of different sizes. There are more than one blocks of
spectrum in each of these regions, such that competitors simultaneously operate in the same
geographic area, but on different frequencies.
I consider the following reduced-form model for provider i’s bid on block of frequency k in





∆inznk + γik + νi + ξik (12)
where γik is block k’s fixed effect on player i’s bids (constant across different geographic regions)
and ξik is some region-specific idiosyncratic shock assumed to be mean 0 across blocks. Notice
that the full vector x = [x′1, . . . ,x′N ]
′ is included as regressors for player i’s bids. Furthermore,
player i’s bids are allowed to depend on its competitors’. This is justified by the fact that the
11Proposing a structural bidding model for spectrum auction falls outside the scope of the current article.
Conventional econometric auction theory does not readily applies in this context due to providers simultane-
aously bidding on different licenses and potential complementarities between these licenses. In fact, recent
contributions in this literature typically avoid having to directly estimate an auction model. For instance,
Fox and Bajari (2013) estimate a matching model and Xiao and Yuan (2018) interpret bidding decisions via a
dynamic game of market entry.
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AWS1-2008 auction was a multiple-round simultaneous ascending auction in which, at the end
of each round, bidders knew there competitors’ bids. One therefore expects competitors’ bids
to affect a provider’s bidding behaviour.
Then, letting z̄i ≡ K−1
∑K
k=1 zik be player i’s average bid over the different K blocks in the









∆inE [zn] + E [γi] + νi. (13)
In other words, player i’s realized common-knowledge unobserved heterogeneity asymptotically
(when K → ∞) corresponds to the residual of a linear regression of player i’s average bid in
the geographic region of interest on a constant, the observed state variables and competitors’
bids. In other words, provider i’s common-knowledge payoff-relevant unobserved heterogeneity
is assumed to correspond to the variation in player i’s bids that is not explained by all observed
common-knowledge state variables nor its competitors’ bids, and that is constant across blocks
of spectrum. Therefore, unobservable information that consistently affects bids over different
blocks is captured by νi.
Of course, this residual interpretation is not ideal, but it is still preferable than simply
ignoring common-knowledge unobserved heterogeneity in an industry where it should be a
first-order concern. To the extent that providers take into account how technology, spectrum
compatibility, agreements, etc. may affect their payoffs when bidding for spectrum and that this
information is not captured by the other regressors included in (12), variation in ν recovered
from providers’ bids should reflect variation in common-knowledge unobserved heterogeneity
relevant for transceivers’ locations. The timing of the realisation of bids also supports ν being
common-knowledge when the transceivers’ location game is played. As the auction is completed
prior to the transceivers’ location game, player-specific payoff-relevant information recovered
in ν is revealed at the auction stage and is common-knowledge when providers decide where
to install their transceivers. In Section 6, when I estimate the model, I do find evidence that
residuals estimated from bids are capturing significant determinants of transceivers’ locations
not controlled for by observed state variables.
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4 Data
The model just described will be estimated for N = 4 Canadian mobile service providers: three
national incumbents (Rogers, Bell and Telus) and one new entrant (Vidéotron). I consider
location decisions for transceivers operating on frequencies allocated in the AWS1-2008 auction.
I now briefly describe the data that will be used for estimation.
4.1 Transceivers
Data on transceivers’ locations are constructed using the Technical and Administrative Fre-
quency Lists maintained by Industry Canada. I observe a 2016 snapshot of all transceivers
associated with mobile services in Canada. For each transceiver, I observe the owner, its geo-
graphic location and the frequencies on which it operates, among other characteristics.
Frequencies are used to link transceivers to different auctions. All transceivers operating
on frequencies allocated prior to the AWS1-2008 auction are considered to be stocks at this
auction; transceivers operating on frequencies allocated during this auction are additions. Im-
plicitly, as I do not observe the timing of transceivers’ installations, I am assuming that all
transceivers operating on frequencies allocated during a given auction are installed simultane-
ously. Therefore, I am ignoring some of the dynamics that could be associated with delays in
towers’ constructions and/or spectrum transfers between providers.
Figure 1 in Section 2 shows the location of each player’s transceivers operating on frequencies
allocated up to the AWS1-2008 auction. In other words, these maps include both stocks (for
incumbents) and additions of transceivers associated with this auction.
4.2 Isolated markets
As it is common when estimating games of market entry, I consider location decisions in dif-
ferent isolated markets as being different repetitions of the transceivers’ location game. I use
population centres, i.e. relatively more densely populated areas defined by Statistics Canada,
as isolated markets. These markets are indexed by m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
A nice feature of population centres is that they are physically isolated and surrounded by
rural areas. Of course, it is likely that there is some dependence between transceivers’ locations
within and around a given population centre. For instance, providers may want to ensure that
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their subscribers can use their mobile devices when they travel in rural areas around where
they live or work. By focusing on population centres, i.e. ignoring rural areas, I avoid having
to model this potential correlation between population centres and their surroundings.
Nonetheless, one may be concerned about potential correlation in transceivers’ locations
between large population centres and satellite smaller population centres. For instance, corre-
lation could arise due to people working in a large population centre, but living in a smaller
one. However, conditional on the proximity of a large population centre (and other observable
characteristics as well as recovered common-knowledge unobservables), transceivers’ locations
in small population centres are arguably independent.12
I therefore decided to focus the analysis on small population centres, in order to make
the assumption of small isolated markets more credible. Small population centres are defined
by Statistics Canada as areas with a population between 1,000 and 30,000 people and some
minimum population density. I restrict the analysis to population centres located in Ontario
and Quebec because these are the provinces where all 4 players own spectrum licenses. Overall,
there are M = 459 small population centres in these two provinces.
Geographic coordinates are used to match transceivers with the market they belong to.
For each market, one can count how many transceivers are associated with each provider. A
non trivial share of markets are such that there is no transceiver within the boundary of the
population centre, but some right outside of it. Both for stocks and additions of transceivers, I
therefore consider all transceivers within a 5 kilometres buffer zone around a population centre
as being part of that population centre.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, an important factor determining the need for more transceivers
in a given area is the population density in this area. This variable is also observed for each
population centre.
12For instance, Rogers install transceivers in Rougemont and in Val-David (two small population centres
around Montreal) because they are close to Montreal; not because it installs transceivers in Bromont (another
small population centre near Montreal).
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4.3 Bids
Frequencies from 8 different blocks (3 of them being set aside for new entrants and regional
players) were allocated during the AWS1-2008 auction.13 A total of 282 licenses were allocated,
with winning bids summing to approximately CAD$ 4.3 billion. This auction was the first one
in which Vidéotron obtained licenses required to set up a network.
Population centres are matched with their corresponding tier regions. As tiers are larger
than population centres, there are several markets in each tier region. Furthermore, as the
analysis focuses on small population centres, I had to assign a share of tier-level bids (which
also include medium and large population centres) to each market of interest. I used population-
weighted bids, i.e. a given population centre’s share of bids for a license is the share of this
market’s population compared with the population of all population centres covered by the tier.
This assignment is sensible because providers typically bid higher for licenses covering more
populated area.
I obtained each players’ bids in each round of the AWS1-2008 auction from Industry Canada.
Two features of the bids are worth mentioning. First, I observe both winning and non-winning
bids. In particular, observing non-winning bids is helpful to recover information about un-
observable heterogeneity for all players, i.e. not only winners. Second, firms typically bid on
multiple blocks of spectrum in a given tier. The average of players’ highest population-weighted
bids for each license that covers a given market are used to construct predetermined outcomes.
Finally, By combining license allocations resulting from the auction with public information
regarding licenses’ transfers, I construct variables indicating whether each provider owns some
spectrum license in each market. Licence ownership is used to determine potential entrants.
4.4 Summary statistics
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Table 1 summarizes the information available at the market level, for each provider. A few
observations are worth pointing out.
First of all, there are important asymmetries between the three incumbents (Rogers, Bell
13For detailed information about the AWS1-2008 auction, see Industry Canada (2007) and Industry Canada’s
webpage on this specific auction (http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/h_sf08891.html).
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and Telus). Telus is adding very few transceivers relatively to Rogers and Bell, especially in
Ontario. Moreover, compared to Rogers, Bell and Telus typically install transceivers in fewer
markets, but tend to install more of them in markets where they add some. A similar remark
can be made regarding stocks of transceivers. This behaviour is coherent with Bell and Telus
sharing their network.14
Second, Vidéotron barely installs transceivers in Ontario even if it owns licenses covering
35% of the small population centres in this province. This is an example of a new entrant
failling to use some of the set-aside licenses it acquired during the auction. Nonetheless, in
Quebec, Vidéotron installs transceivers in many more markets than Bell and Telus do, but
still less than Rogers. It also installs more than 10 transceivers in a larger number of markets
compared to the incumbents. Notice that, besides Vidéotron in Ontario, all providers own at
least one license covering all markets considered in the analysis.
Finally, the main objective of spectrum set-asides is to help new entrants acquiring licenses
at lower prices. Set-asides therefore partially explain why Vidéotron’s average population-
weighted bids tend to be lower than the incumbents’. Notice, however, that the difference
observed in Ontario is also due to the fact that there are some markets for which Vidéotron
decided not to bid on any license available.
5 Identification
Identifying strategic interactions in an empirical game such as the one described above is
complicated by decisions being made simultaneously. The problem can be understood as follows.
Under the parametric specification stated in equation (11), expected payoffs depend on strategic
interactions through:





δinynPn (yn|x,ν) . (14)
Separate identification of βi from strategic interactions {δin}n∈N\{i} requires variation in com-
petitors’ CCPs, i.e. Pn (yn|x,ν) for n 6= i, that keeps xi, νi fixed. In other words, if xi, νi do
not vary across individuals, the separate identification of βi and {δin}n∈N\{i} is entirely driven
14While Telus seems to be taking advantage of Bell’s network in the eastern part of Canada, the roles are
reversed in the western part of the country. See Figure 1.
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by functional form assumptions.
Both in games of complete (e.g., Tamer, 2003) and incomplete information (see for instance
the identification arguments of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2003; Bajari, Hong, Krainer,
and Nekipelov; 2010), a natural source of variation that is commonly leveraged for separate
identification is an exclusion restriction in observable player-specific regressors. In other words,
some elements of xi are assumed to be specific to player i. As a result, these regressors only
affect competitors’ expected payoffs through their beliefs regarding player i’s decision, i.e. its
CCPs.
In the current empirical application, competitors’ stocks of transceivers can be used as
player-specific variables satisfying the usual exclusion restriction, in the same spirit as other
studies have used firms’ incumbency status. The argument here is that competitors’ decisions
are sufficient statistics for their stocks of transceivers. Unfortunately, Vidéotron’s stocks are zero
in all markets. There is therefore no observable regressor generating an exogenous variation that
would allow one to identify the new entrant’s impact on incumbents’ location decisions. Such
strategic interactions are key to assess incumbents’ equilibrium responses to any counterfactual
policy that would encourage the new entrant’s investments.15
In other cases where excluded player-specific regressors are not available, it has been sug-
gested to exploit the identifying power generated by multiple equilibria being realized in the
data. This reasonning can be found in Sweeting (2009), De Paula and Tang (2012) and
Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi (2016). If one can identify equilibrium-specific CCPs, the ar-
gument is very similar to using variation in player-specific regressors satisfying the required
exclusion restriction: multiple equilibria shift CCPs for a given realisation of observed state
variables. One limitation of this approach is that it is applicable to games of (pure) incomplete
information. It relies on the important assumption that the only source of correlation between
players’ decisions, conditional on observed state variables, must be due to equilibria multiplic-
ity. When one is especially concerned with common-knowledge unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals, as in the current setting, identification arguments based on multiple equilibria are
therefore not directly applicable.
In fact, the need to take into account common-knowledge unobserved heterogeneity is the
15Notice that, while bids for spectrum licenses are observed for all players including new entrants, they cannot
be used as regressors satisfying the exclusion restriction, as Zi is not even included in player i’s payoffs. This
interpretation is coherent with bids being sunk costs when building a mobile network.
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main motivation for recovering it from predetermined outcomes. There are two important
advantages of doing so. First, once one is able to control for common-knowledge unobserved
heterogeneity as well as observed state variables, then players’ decisions should be independent if
there is a single equilibrium realized in the data. In other words, conditional on the unobserved
heterogeneity, one can use variation in equilibria to identify strategic interactions.
The second important advantage is that player-specific common-knowledge payoff-relevant
unobserved heterogeneity satisfies the exclusion restriction needed to identify strategic inter-
actions. To the extent that νi in (11) varies across i’s, recovered ν−i’s represent a potential
source of variation that will help to identify parameters measuring how competitors’ decisions
affect i’s payoffs.
It is worth noting that the idea of using predetermined outcomes to recover unobservables
has been proposed in other settings as well. A recent example from the auction literature is
Roberts (2013) who uses reserve prices to control for auctioned objects’ heterogeneity that is
known to all bidders, but not to the econometrician. Another well-known example in industrial
organization is Olley and Pakes (1996) who use investment in capital to identify unobserved
productivity in production function estimation. In education and in labour economics, test
scores are often used to recover students’ unobserved ability (or more precisely their distri-
bution as in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman, 2003). Furthermore, leveraging the identifying
power of exogenous variation in unobservable variables shares similarities with Matzkin (2004,
2016)’s unobservable instruments approach. For instance, consider a model with two simul-
taneous equations where an instrument is available for only one of these equations. Matzkin
shows how to recover the unobservable random term from the equation for which a valid in-
strument is available and uses this unobservable as an instrument for the other equation. As in
the argument I propose, this approach takes advantage of some unobservable variables’ useful
exclusion properties to identify the primitives of the model.
In order to illustrate how both ν−i and τ helps to identify strategic interactions, notice that
Assumption 2 implies that one can write (14) as:








Pn (yn|x,ν, τ)λ (τ |x,ν) (15)
where |T∗ (x,ν)| is the number of equilibria realized in the data and T∗ (x,ν) ⊆ T (x,ν). In the
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worst case scenario where xi does not vary at all across i’s, different values of ν−i and τ still
shift competitors’ CCPs, therefore providing variation that allows one to identify {δin}n∈N\{i}
separately from βi.
It should be noted that (15) supposes that one is able to identify equilibrium-specific CCPs
conditional on x,ν. This may be possible, for instance, if one observes a panel in which the
same markets are observed over a long period of time. If one is willing to assume that the same
equilibrium is played over time (as in Sweeting, 2009), then one could allow markets with the
same realized x,ν to follow different equilibria.
Unfortunately, in the current empirical application, I observe each market only once. In
Section 6, I report estimates for different specifications including some allowing for multiple
equilibria in the data. In those cases, CCPs are assumed to be mixed over two “types” of
equilibria, regardless of the values of x,ν. In other words, such specifications are based on an
assumption that is stronger than Assumption 2 as the set of equilibria realized in the data and
the equilibrium selection mechanism are not allowed to vary with x,ν.
Of course, if one wants to leverage both unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria
to identify strategic interactions, one must be able to recover the former separately from the
latter. Here, predetermined outcomes being conditionnally independent of which equilibrium is
being played in the game of interest, i.e. Assumption 3(ii), is key. Again, providers bidding on
licenses without knowing who will be the potential entrants in the transceivers’ location game
suggests that this assumption is satisfied in the current empirical application.
6 Estimation results
I now turn to the estimation of the econometric model. Transceivers’ location decisions are
studied through the ordered-response model introduced in Section 3. Following the AWS1-
2008 spectrum auction, Rogers, Bell, Telus and Vidéotron simultaneously decide how many
transceivers to install in several small population centres. Additions to player i’s stocks of
transceivers are discretized such that Y = {0, 1, 2} where j = 1 corresponds to 1-10 transceivers
and j = 2 is 11+ transceivers. The estimation proceeds in three stages: the common-knowledge
unobserved heterogeneity is recovered and then, a simple two-stage estimator along the lines of
Hotz and Miller (1993) is applied, with some specifications allowing for multiple equilibria when
23
estimating reduced-form CCPs. Standard errors of the third stage’s estimates are computed
from bootstrapped samples to take into account sampling variation from the first two stages. I
now describe each step with more details.
Step 1. Player-specific common-knowledge unobservable heterogeneity is recovered from






∆inz̄nm + γ̄i + νim (16)
by using ordinary least squares separately for each player and recovering the residuals denoted
ν̂i. The variables included in xm are: population density, distance to the closest large population
centre, incumbents’ stocks of transceivers (in natural logarithms after having added 1 to avoid
zeros) and a Quebec province fixed effect.
Recovered ν̂i being only required in markets where provider i owns a license, the model is
estimated using markets for which the dependent variable z̄i is strictly positive. This restriction
is imposed because z̄i = 0 can be interpreted as a corner solution in providers’ bidding behaviour
which could be rationalized by a non-unique value of νi.
Step 2. Given the estimated unobservable heterogeneity, one can construct choice proba-
bilities conditioned on both x and ν̂. Ideally one would like to use a flexible estimator such
as simple non-parametric estimators of conditional probabilities. Unfortunately, the limited
sample size forces me to use a parametric specification for these choice probabilities. I use a
player-specific ordered logit specification to estimate reduced-form CCPs. Let h (x, ν̂;φi) be
a parametric function of x, ν̂ with a vector of parameters φi specific to each player. The
variables included in x are the same as the ones used to recover ν̂. In the current application,
h (x, ν̂;φi) is a simple first-order polynomial, but higher orders could be accommodated with a
larger number of observations. Letting ηi = [ηi (1-10) , ηi (11+)]
′ be threshold parameters (also
specific to each player), the reduced-form choice probability of player i choosing y ∈ Y, which
is denoted as Pi (y|x, ν̂;φi,ηi), is given by:
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
Λ (ηi (1-10)− h (x, ν̂;φi)) , for 0 transceiver
Λ (ηi (11+)− h (x, ν̂;φi))− Λ (ηi (1-10)− h (x, ν̂;φi)) , for 1-10 transceivers
1− Λ (ηi (11+)− h (x, ν̂;φi)) , for 11+ transceivers.
(17)






and estimates of φ̂i, η̂i are computed separately for each provider by (pseudo) maximum like-
lihood. Let the estimated reduced-form CCPs be denoted P̂i (yi|x, ν̂) ≡ Pi
(
yi|x, ν̂; φ̂i, η̂i
)
.
In the specifications where I allow for two types of equilibria to be realized in the data,
equilibrium-specific CCPs are defined by allowing thresholds ηi to vary across τ ∈ {1, 2}.
Equilibrium-specific CCPs Pi (y|x, ν̂;φi,ητi ) are defined as in (17) after replacing ηi with ητi .
























where λ is the probability corresponding to equilibrium of type 1 being realized. The joint
likelihood for all players is maximized using the EM algorithm. As the resulting mixture may
generate some local maxima, I initiate the search algorithm at 50 different randomly selected
starting values and retain the estimates corresponding to the highest likelihood function. The
resulting equilibrium-specific CCPs are denoted P̂i (yi|x, ν̂, τ) ≡ Pi
(
yi|x, ν̂; φ̂i, η̂τi
)
and λ̂ is
the estimated equlibrium selection mechanism.
Step 3. The marginal revenues’ and marginal costs’ parameters defining players’ choices
according to the model presented in Section 3.2 are estimated. To do so, expected payoffs are
constructed by using the estimated reduced-form CCPs. Let the expected index function be:





δinynP̂n (yn|x, ν̂) (20)
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where xi includes all the variables in x, except competitors’ stocks of transceivers. Then, one




κi (1-10)− ζP̂i (x, ν̂;θi)
)
, for 0 transceiver
Λ
(




κi (1-10)− ζP̂i (x, ν̂;θi)
)
, for 1-10 transceivers
1− Λ
(
κi (11+)− ζP̂i (x, ν̂;θi)
)
, for 11+ transceivers.
(21)




Pi (j|xm, ν̂m;θi,κi)1{yim=j} (22)
and maximizing the corresponding provider-specific likelihood function delivers the estimates
θ̂i, κ̂i. In specifications allowing for multiple equilibria, equilibrium-specific structural CCPs
Pi (y|x, ν̂, τ ;θi,κi) are constructed similarly as above, but using equilibrium-specific reduced-
form CCPs when constructing expected payoffs. Then, contribution of player i in market m to












[Insert Table 2 here.]
Pseudo maximum likelihood estimates of θi,κi ∀i are reported in Table 2. In order to as-
sess the respective identifying power of the recovered unobserved heterogeneity and equilibria
multiplicity, I consider four different specifications. The “baseline” specification ignores the
identification problem due to the absence of player-specific regressors satisfying the exclusion
restriction for Vidéotron. In this case, identification of incumbents’ responses to Vidéotron’s
decisions are entirely driven by functional form assumptions. Then, I consider two other spec-
ifications that separately allows for “multiple equilibria” and for “unobserved heterogeneity”.
Results from these two specifications can be used to compare estimates obtained from each al-
ternative source of variation in this setting. Finally, “both” multiple equilibria and unobserved
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heterogeneity are combined in the last specification.
An important result that is worth highlighting from Table 2 is that there is not much evi-
dence that allowing for multiple equilibria being realized in the data helps to identify the primi-
tives of the model. In fact, comparing the “baseline” with the “multiple equilibria” specifications
shows that the mixture over two types of equilibria does not change much the parameters’ es-
timates. It even slightly increases the bootstrapped standard errors for many parameters. The
same comment holds when comparing the “unobserved heterogeneity” and the “both” specifica-
tions. Furthermore, allowing for a finite mixture over two types of equilibria only slightly im-
proves the average log-likelihood function evaluated at the estimated parameters from −1.6200
(“baseline”) to −1.6194 (“multiple equilibria”); it even slightly decreases from −1.5922 (“unob-
served heterogeneity”) to −1.5954 (“both”) when unobserved heterogeneity is included. One
potential reason for this result is that allowing for two types of equlibria that do not depend
on the common-knowledge state variables may be too coarse for an approximation of multiple
equilibria being realized in the data. Another explanation is that there is not much evidence
of multiple equilibria in this specific context. In the current setting, this would imply that the
same equilibrium is realized whenever the same game is played within a given province.16
However, including recovered common-knowledge unobserved heterogeneity considerably
changes some ot the estimates, especially strategic interactions. The parameter measuring the
effect of recovered unobserved heterogeneity being only significant for Vidétron is encouraging
for two reasons. First, remember that Vidéotron is the only player without accumulated stocks
of transceivers, i.e. the player-specific regressor excluded from competitors’ payoffs. The fact
that Vidéotron’s recovered unobserved heterogeneity has a statistically significant effect on its
payoffs suggests that the recovered unobservables will generate appreciable shifts in Vidéotron’s
decisions that will effectively help to identify parameters measuring the effect of these decisions
on incumbents’ payoffs. Second, the statistical significance being limited to Vidéotron is also
aligned with the interpretation of ν suggested earlier. An important justification of introduc-
ing common-knowledge unobserved heterogeneity in the econometric model is that there may
be relevant unobservable information regarding agreements between providers, transceivers’
16While this claim is hard to verify in practice, it is further supported by the counterfactual analysis proposed
below. When solving for the equilibrium of the model at the preferred parameters’ estimates, I always find the
same solution despite initiating the solver at 100 different randomly selected starting values. If there is effectively
a single equilibrium in the model, there must be a single equilibrium realized in the data.
27
technology, etc. Firms’ bids should reflect such information. However, especially if previous
agreements are expected to hold after the AWS2008-1 auction and if there are no abrupt changes
in the technology used, incumbents’ stocks of transceivers may also reflect this unobservable
information. If that’s the case, then incumbents’ recovered unobserved heterogeneity should
not be expected to significantly affect incumbents’ payoffs, as is observed here.
While the “unobserved heterogeneity” specification does not systematically imply a reduction
in estimates’ standard errors compared to the “baseline” case, some important reductions are
worth pointing out: Vidéotron’s and Telus’ effects on Rogers’ and Bell’s payoffs are considerably
more precisely estimated when recovered unobserved heterogeneity is included as a regressor.
Once again, this observation is consistent with Vidéotron’s recovered unobserved heterogeneity
providing a source of variation that helps to identify how its decisions affect incumbents’ payoffs.
For these reasons, combined with the fact that it is associated with the highest average
log-likelihood, “unobserved heterogeneity” will be treated as the preferred specification for the
rest of the article.
Some estimation results from this preferred specification are worth discussing. First, con-
sider the parameters associated with population density and distance to closest large population
centre. Most of the population density parameters’ estimates not being significantly different
from zero may be a consequence of focusing on small population centres which all have a modest
density. Furthermore, as expected, payoffs decrease in markets that are further from a large
population centre for almost all providers.
One of the most important result that is worth mentioning is the relative contribution of
each incumbent’s own stocks of transceivers to their payoffs. The corresponding coefficients (re-
spectively 2.413, 1.914 and 2.948 for Rogers, Bell and Telus) suggest that increasing a provider’s
accumulated stocks of transceivers has a positive and significant effect on its payoffs. In other
words, transceivers’ locations are associated with important economies of density: incumbents
are more likely to add new transceivers where they already own some. Intuitively, it may be
less costly for providers to improve an existing network rather than building a brand new one.
This observation potentially explains why new entrants fail to use some of their spectrum or go
out of business. In fact, new entrants cannot benefit from such economies of density, as they are
building brand new networks without having accumulated stocks of transceivers. This asymme-
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try between incumbents and new entrants motivates the counterfactual experiment proposed
in Section 7.
Let’s now turn to strategic interactions’ estimates. These parameters are relatively precisely
estimated for all providers, except Telus. Large standard errors for the latter are likely due to
the fact that Telus installs 0 transceivers in a bit more than 85% of the markets considered
in the analysis, therefore leaving a small fraction of observations with interesting variation to
identify the parameters of the model. It is also important to note that the strategic interactions’
estimates capture the effect of the number of transceivers installed by competitors on a given
player’s payoffs (as opposed to the entry effect typically captured in binary games). A priori,
competitors’ decisions could be strategic substitutes if one expects a provider not to install
transceivers where another does. In particular, this is the case for Bell and Telus (with reciprocal
estimates equal to −1.325 and −0.190). The fact that most strategic interactions (8 out of 12)
are estimated to be positive suggests that transceivers’ locations are strategic complements.
This complementarity can be explained by providers competing over network quality.
Another important observation regarding strategic interactions is that, as expected, com-
petitors do not all affect a given player’s payoffs the same way. For instance, while Rogers and
Bell positively affect each other’s payoffs (reciprocal estimates being 1.582 and 2.561, signif-
icant at the 99% level), these two incumbents’ payoffs do not significantly depend on Telus’
nor Vidéotron’s decisions. Telus not significantly impacting the other incumbents’ decision
is consistent with the fact that it only installs transceivers in less than 15% of the markets
studied. Nonetheless, Telus and Vidéotron both have a significant effect on each other’s pay-
offs (reciprocal estimates being 3.360 and 0.854, respectively significant at the 95% and the
99% levels). Strategic interactions’ estimates also support evidence of asymmetric responses
between providers. One important observation that will explain some of the counterfactual
results presented below is that, while Vidéotron does not have a significant impact on Rogers’
payoffs (relatively small positive estimate of 0.935), the reverse does not hold (2.506, significant
at the 99% level).
Finally, threshold parameters have a relevant structural interpretation: they measure the
marginal costs of installing transceivers. These parameters’ estimates will be key for the coun-
terfactual analysis. The inclusion of province fixed effects, combined with the linear specifica-
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tion of marginal revenues, allows one to interpret marginal costs as varying across provinces.
More precisely, threshold parameters’ estimates correspond to marginal costs in the omitted
province (i.e., Ontario). Notice that because the Quebec province fixed effect enters the Λ (·)
function linearly in (20) via xi, Quebec-specific marginal costs are obtained by subtracting
this fixed effect from the threshold parameters’ estimates. For example, Rogers’ estimated
marginal costs of installing 1-10 and 11+ transceivers in Ontario are 1.501 and 10.49 (respec-
tively significantly different from zero with 95% and 99% confidence). In Quebec, they become
1.501−(1.030) = 0.471 and 10.49−(1.030) = 9.46, but the difference between the two provinces
is not significantly different from zero. The only providers for which there is a significant dif-
ference in costs across provinces are Telus (lower in Ontario) and Vidéotron (lower in Quebec).
Unfortunately, one cannot directly compare marginal costs’ estimates across providers because
the payoffs’ scale has been fixed by normalizing the variance of the private information shocks,
which may vary across firms. Some expected patterns are still worth noting. In particular, the
ratio of the 11+ over the 1-10 threshold estimates is much larger for Rogers (10.49/1.501 = 6.99)
than the others. This observation reflects that Rogers typically installs at least one transceiver
in more markets than its competitors, but does not install as many transceivers in each market
as other providers do. Another extreme is Bell, with a ratio of 11.67/10.20 = 1.14, which sug-
gests that Bell does not install transceivers in as many markets as Rogers, but tends to install
more transceivers where it does.
7 Counterfactuals
As already mentioned, new entrants do not benefit from economies of density generated by ac-
cumulated stocks of transceivers because they must build brand new networks. Taking as given
the government’s objective to increase competition in the mobile telecommunications industry
and the drawbacks associated with spectrum set-asides, this asymmetry between incumbents
and new entrants may justify subsidizing the first few transceivers installed by the latter.
I use the estimated model to provide valuable insights regarding the effects of such a policy.
Intuitively, subsidizing Vidéotron’s transceivers should increase the probability that it invests
in a given market. This change in probabilities of installing transceivers will also have an effect
on the incumbents’ investment probabilities because, in equilibrium, these are defined as best
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responses to their competitors’ expected behaviour. Evaluating this indirect effect is key to
be able to judge whether subsidizing new entrants such as Vidéotron is a desirable policy or if
new entrants’ investments would be crowded out by a reduction in incumbents’ probabilities of
installing transceivers. Notice that this indirect effect of the subsidy would not be captured by
a model ignoring strategic interactions between network operators.
Counterfactual experiments are performed separately for three representative markets in
both provinces considered in the analysis. For each province, these are the markets correspond-
ing to the 25-th, 50-th and 75-th population density percentiles, conditional on all providers
owning at least one license. Such markets are described in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
I consider a subsidy that decreases the province-specific marginal costs of installing 1-10
transceivers for Vidéotron only. Using the parameters’ estimates from the preferred specifica-
tion, I compute the equilibrium choice probabilities17 associated with a reduction going from
0% to 100% of these marginal costs. The evolution of the equilibrium CCPs for different val-
ues of the subsidy is reported in Figures 2 and 3. In each figure, I report the probability of
installing a positive number of transceivers in the first row of plots. The evolution of these
probabilities can be interpreted as an illustration of the policy’s effect at the extensive margin.
The second, third and fourth rows respectively report the probabilities of installing 0, 1-10 and
11+ transceivers. This breakdown corresponds to the intensive margin.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
At the extensive margin, the subsidy has the expected effect in all representative markets: it
never decreases Vidéotron’s probabilities of installing a positive number of transceivers. How-
ever, there is striking heterogeneity in the observed responses. In fact, while the subsidy may
generate a fairly strong response from Vidéotron in some markets (e.g., probabilities of a pos-
itive number of transceivers going from about 5% to above 80% in Ontario’s representative
markets), the effect is much smaller (an increase of about 20 percentage points in Quebec’s
17Looking for multiple equilibria, I initiated the solution algorithm at 100 different randomly picked starting
values of CCPs. In all representative markets, I always found a single equilibrium for all values of the subsidy.
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25-th and 75-th percentiles) or even non existing in others (e.g., Quebec’s 50th percentile mar-
ket). One interpretation of this heterogeneity is that there may be more room for new entrants
in Ontario than in Quebec, where Vidéotron has already become an important player. This
observation suggests that policies targeting the introduction of a fourth national player in the
industry should not be expected to be equally successful in all provinces.
Still at the extensive margin, one should note that there are minor responses in incumbents’
probabilities of installing a positive number of transceivers as an indirect effect of the subsidy.
In Ontario, there is a slight increase in such probabilities for Rogers’ and Telus’, but a slight
decrease for Bell. Incumbents’ behaviour is left unchanged in Quebec. In all cases, the size of
Bell’s reduction does not crowd out the new entrant’s and other incumbents’ increases, which
is coherent with the strategic complementarities estimated above.
At the intensive margin, it is clear that most of the action is happening from providers shift-
ing from installing 0 transceiver to installing 1-10. In some sense, this is reassuring. Remember
that the analysis is focusing on small population centres. If the subsidy was to incentivize the
new entrant to install a large number of transceivers, one should have become suspicious that
the subsidy could lead to wasteful investments, especially if Vidéotron became much more likely
to install 11+ transceivers compared to incumbents.
An important caveat is worth mentioning at this stage: the constructed representative
markets took the common-knowledge unobservable heterogeneity as exogenously given. Pre-
sumably, as part of this heterogeneity may include the effects of agreements on each provider’s
payoff, it would be preferable to allow these agreements to vary with the counterfactual experi-
ments. However, it is not easy to model how these unobservables would change in a hypothetical
world.
8 Conclusion
I estimate a game of transceivers’ location decisions between three national incumbents and a
new entrant using data from the Canadian mobile telecommunications industry. Estimation
results suggest that economies of density may explain why new entrants do not always use
their allocated spectrum or even go out of business. In a counterfactual experiment, I study
the impact of subsidizing the new entrant’s first few transceivers to compensate the absence of
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economies of density generated by accumulated stocks. I find that such a subsidy can increase
the probability that the new entrant and the incumbents install new transceivers. The slight
decrease observed for one of the incumbents is not enough to crowd out direct and indirect
increases in investments generated by the subsidy.
An important feature of the identification strategy is that I recover information from
providers’ bids which I interpret as player-specific unobserved heterogeneity. By comparing
different specifications of the econometric model, I show that variation in recovered unobserved
heterogeneity helps to identify the model’s parameters. In fact, such recovered unobservables
play the role of player-specific regressors that satisfy an exclusion restriction required to iden-
tify strategic interactions. Without this source of variation, incumbents’ responses to the new
entrant’s decisions, i.e. a set of crucial parameters when studying the counterfactual policy,
would only be identified by functional form assumptions. A similar identification argument us-
ing predetermined outcomes to recover player-specific unobservables may be appealing in other
settings. In particular, it complements the identifying power of multiple equilibria already
proposed in the literature.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for population centres
Ontario Quebec
0 1-10 11+ 0 1-10 11+
Additions of transceivers
Rogers 46 176 15 64 142 16
Bell 151 39 47 173 26 23
Telus 227 6 4 166 29 27
Vidéo 230 5 2 96 85 41
mean min max mean min max
Population density 0.777 0.148 3.707 0.771 0.101 2.887
Distance to large population centre 0.853 0.099 4.780 1.266 0.122 7.550
Stocks of transceivers
Rogers 8.426 0.000 55.00 5.725 0.000 54.00
Bell 38.28 0.000 242.0 21.06 0.000 155.0
Telus 1.008 0.000 48.00 11.83 0.000 220.0
Population-weighted bids
Rogers 0.0534 0.0030 0.5242 0.0620 0.0073 0.4501
Bell 0.0585 0.0051 0.4375 0.0549 0.0024 0.4514
Telus 0.0457 0.0023 0.3882 0.0611 0.0067 0.5241
Vidéo 0.0354 0.0000 0.3375 0.0564 0.0028 0.5791
Licenses
Rogers 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Bell 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Telus 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Vidéo 0.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of markets 237 222
Notes: Additions of transceivers are the numbers of markets associated with the corresponding bin used in
the ordered-response model that is estimated. Population density is in 103 persons per square kilometre.
Distance to closest large population centre is in degrees. Stocks of transceivers are the numbers of transceivers
operating on frequencies allocated prior to the AWS1-2008 auction. Population-weighted bids are in 106



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Representative markets
Stocks of transceivers Unobserved heterogeneity
Percentiles Pop. dens. Dist. Rogers Bell Telus Rogers Bell Telus Vidéo
Ontario
25-th 0.574 1.127 1.386 3.689 0.000 0.0047 -0.0098 -0.0069 0.0088
50-th 0.745 0.473 2.079 2.565 0.000 0.0082 -0.0084 -0.0062 0.0059
75-th 0.965 0.805 1.609 3.951 0.000 0.0071 -0.0084 -0.0087 0.0056
Quebec
25-th 0.424 1.698 0.000 3.091 0.000 0.0061 0.0102 -0.0119 -0.0016
50-th 0.633 0.513 2.197 4.533 0.000 0.0786 -0.1236 0.0448 0.0527
75-th 0.967 0.509 1.386 2.996 0.000 -0.0063 0.0010 -0.0036 0.0045
Notes: In each province, the markets corresponding to the 25-th, 50-th and 75-th percentiles according to population density
are treated as representative markets. Only markets where all providers have licenses are considered. The table reports
the corresponding values of population density (in 103 persons per square kilometre), distance to closest large population
centre (in degrees), stocks of transceivers (in natural logarithms, after adding 1 to avoid 0’s) and unobserved heterogeneity







































































































































































































































































































































































































Rogers Bell Telus Video
Notes: Equilibrium probabilities of adding more than 0, 0, 1-10 and 11+ transceivers for different levels of
subsidy. Representative markets corresponding to the 25-th, 50-th and 75-th percentiles of the population
density, conditional on all providers owning spectrum licenses. Probabilities are plotted for a 0% to 100%
reduction of Vidéotron’s marginal costs of installing 1-10 transceivers.
Figure 2: Effect of subsidy on probabilities of installing transceivers – Ontario
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Rogers Bell Telus Video
Notes: Equilibrium probabilities of adding more than 0, 0, 1-10 and 11+ transceivers for different levels of
subsidy. Representative markets corresponding to the 25-th, 50-th and 75-th percentiles of the population
density, conditional on all providers owning spectrum licenses. Probabilities are plotted for a 0% to 100%
reduction of Vidéotron’s marginal costs of installing 1-10 transceivers.
Figure 3: Effect of subsidy on probabilities of installing transceivers – Quebec
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